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THESIS ABSTRACT
This study will
Buber's

authenticity.

authenticity
dictory

cf Ma-rtin -

l1he problem of the foundations

in Jean-Paul

Sartre

to be authentic".

of

who makes contra-

when he says on the one hand there

ethical

separated

the foundations

1

arises

claims

objective

tion?

investigate

values

while

on the other

The questions

from objective

are

values

1 ,

says "we ought

Can authenticity

and still

And what are the foundations

are no

be

impose an obliga-

for saying

"we ought

to be authentic"?
In the first
(actuality)

section

is examined and will

legitimate

foundation

obliga.tion

in reference

values

Buber with another
notion

notion

oy implying

some
an

reviews

foundation

Buber's
hew this

acceptance

of

acceptance

of authenticity.

(responsibility)

provides

Buber's

is essential

to

i

understanding
their

his views on objective

ontological

·

to what man "ought to be".

and discusses

of Verant wortung

of Wirklich keit

be shown. to provide

for authenticity

The second section
objective

Buber's

foundation

in God.

ethical

values

and

The third

section

poi~ts

cut how Buber's

overcomes the ex isten t i al :nothingness

philosophy

th at ccnfronts

modern

man.

In the Conclusion
philosophy,
it,

the value

and importance

as well as so me of the problems

are discussed.

of Buber's

connected

with
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INTRODUCTION
.The Pr ·oblem and the

It

seems odd that

philosophy

of Martin

thinkers

could

insights

to be gained

by a short,

Furthermore,
makes fer

Sartre's

apart.

account

atheistic

contrasts

valuable

in general

authenticity.
existentialism

with Buber's

the study

of the foundation

in Sartre.

H.is existentialism

how he can,

on the one hand,

other

authenticity

of Sartrean

extrerr1e,

for no two

I will

religious

be making

evident.

The problsm

on the

in the

But the1"e are

concerning

and throughout

contrasts

on authenticity

Buber I begin with Sartre,

some interesting

existentialism
these

in a study

be further

critical

Plan

exhort

from two sides

of authenticity

One wonders

is confounding.
deny objective

us to be authentic.

of his mouth,

Alfred

values,

utter

so ~requently

Stern

remarks,

the

most

offensive
value judgments,
with ·che
most apodictic
certainty,
on the moral
behavior
of other people,
and cla .im
1

while

He seems to speak

It is strange that a philosopher,
who
denies in this way all bases for value
judgments that are objectively
valid,
would

surfaces

2

universaJ. vali d i ty fol'· such "philo' sophical
cate go:r.-ies a.s "co ward" .and
,·1d" • 1
1,,...a,,..
;::,
..l..,::l.\.

1

11

The questions

that

to be authentic?
questions

point

come to mind are:

Fredrick
traces

to the axiological

has tried

Olafson,

tion.

to steer

in his

the philosophic

is concerned

basis
Sartre

clear

history

These

of authenticity
in some difficulties.

of .. obligation".

book Principles

with the problem

points

He

an obligation

and why _ ought I become auth~ntic?

and the answer to them invc,lves
Sartre

Is there

and Perso~s,

of ethical

voluntarism

of authenticity

and

and obliga-

out:

It is not difficult
to locate the sources
of the antipathy
whi ch the concept of
obligation
typically
invokes in existentialist
philosophers.
The root notion in
that concept is one of being bound in the
sense of being subject to an effective
restriction
on the permissible
range of
human choice.
Traditionally,
this restrichas been thought
of as indepention itself
dent of and unremo-vable by, human volition.
Indeed, many moralists
have argued that it
1ID!tl be independent
of choice i f we are to
be able to talk--as
we all do--of what we
ought to do even when we do not do it. 2
Sartrean

aut he ntici t y has its

1Alfred
p. 41.

Stern,

2 Fredrick

Maryland:

Sartre~

seeds

(New Yerka

in freedom and
Delta

Ola ..fs on , crj: nciples fi,nd P,ersons,
John Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 192.

Books, 1967),
(Baltimore,

3

sa.ys 01
Ths essential

negation4 : Willia.In

Barrett

ultimate

:freedom that

and final

is to say No.

This is the basic

of human freedoms

though this

cannot

negativ.ity

and a human essence
man's freedom.

is also

because

because

view
negative,

3 Objective

values

too implies

with
because
He says

"what I ought to do",
it

values

they interfere

says No to objective

they impose an obligation,
No to an essence

in Sartre's

11

the

from a man,

very essence

creative,.

are denied

Sartre

be taken

premise

freedom .is in its

freedom,

an obligation:

"what I ought to be",

and because

creator

or designer.

Man is hence the maker of his own

values,

the inventor

nize

his complete

But while Sartre
of obligation

authentic,

of his

an essence

own essence.

freedom and complete
revolts 0

against

one shouldn't

a

He must recogresponsibility.

the traditional

he seems to want to say that
that

implies

4

sources

one ought to be

be a coward or filthy

stinker.
Hazel E. Barnes,

in her An Existentialist

EthjQ§i

3William Barratt,

rxrational Man, (Garden City, New
Yorks Anchor Books, 1962), p. 241.
4cr. Sartre
s discussion
cf "existence
precedes
essence",
Jean-Paul Sartre
"The Humanism of Existentialin ~xj,sten tj_alism, \'lade Baskin editor.
ism", in t:s~
3

8

(New Yorkz

'l'ha Citadel

Press,

1970),

pp.

J4-40.

4

attempts

to bridge

the gap ·between Sartrean

authenticity

and obligation.

She cla ims th at in recognizing

freedom

sees

one also

obligation.

"As process,

responsible

.

fact,

either

finds

this

Sartre's

Sin,

concept
denial

it

authenticity

of obligation

Sartre

seems that

values,

Sartre

6

of Sartre's

(mauvaise

of bad faith:

foi).

7 first,

reintroduced

E. Barnes

translator,

pp • .529-532.

with

authen-

them.

and Barnes would reply
facing

to deny this
Sartre

that

is free

are dishonest

distinguishes

presenting

If

and accepting

Man really

5Hazel E~ Barnes, An ~xistentialist
Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), p. 94.
6cr. Jean-Paul

Barnes

and in contradiction

in honestly

Attempts

this

do not.

to be man's situation.

and respor..siblel

5

to be compatible

value-I

and

denying

person."

has tacitly,

is grounded

in bad faith

involves

or in another

of objective

what they take

types

or evil

and an

tr.an is free

look at the foundation

to his denial
pressed,

guilt,

of objective

shows that

involved

not entity,

in oneself

A deeper
ticity

the responsibility

one is

to oneself
Ethics,

and

two
as true
(New Yorki

Sartre.
Being and Nothingness,
Hazel
(Ne\v York~ The Ci tad el Press,
1956),

/

·7cf.

tentialism,

Jean-Paul

Sartre,

pp. 14 7-186.

!!Bad Faith",

in ~ssays

in Exis-

5

a pleasing

untrue

a displeasing

existence,

honestly

tr ut h.,

Both a:ce flights

both are flights

and ·note,

For Sartre.

travel

and seco nd ! presen t i:ig to on-aself

tmtruth

the key to authentic
accepting

with

all

freedom.

NFundamentally

it

is a way of declaring

in the

off completely

idea that

si ttmtion

and determi,ned

the existentialist

sees

of Sartrean

honest

about

imperative

that

Sartre

all

for what
It

cut himself

or that

he ll

by it.

Good faith,

in accepting

identical
as

the truth

the foundation

in the imperative

More specifically,

existence

be sure,

8 Barnes,

lies

lies

effects

Bad faith

be.

that

we

we ought to be

our freedom and responsibility.

and inauthentic
To

its

that
is a lie.

freedom.

To put it succintly,

authenticity

ought to be honest.

one's

man may either

with his situation

about man's being." 8

or bad faith

to choose what he will

from his

in

one is not responsible

that

he has been or not free
seeks refuge

about

rests

and responsibility

Inauthenticity

is a lie

from authentic

from truthfulness.

existence

the anguish

as

This is an

men and upon which authentic
turns.

and Barnes would deny this

An Existentislis..1

Ethics~

p.

84.

6

intern::ceta.tion
.
'

then

but unles s there
I

there

is no foundatio

.1s a. unive -rsa1 ..imperative

n f or saying

we ought to be

autherrtic.
A nun1ber of commentators

on the unfoundedness
b'ility.

•ha~e made. similar

of Sartre's

Jean .Wahl says,

authenticity

"From Nietzsche

is the road of modern philosophy.
values

are posited

Olafson

summarizes

without

having

a powerful

observations

and responsi-

·to Sartre,

such

In one as in the other,
any foundation."

argument

against

9

Sartre

like

this,

If morality were, at bottom, a matter of
will and choice as the existentialists
believe,
then all obligations
would be
self-imposed.
An obli gation I have created,
however, is one from which I can release
myself; and the latter.
so the argument
goes, is no obligation
at a11.10
Paul

Roubiczek

responsibility

gives
in his

a devastating

critique

of Sartrean

For and Aeainst:

bock ~xistentialisma

Nevertheless,
these existentialists
{who
deny objective
values) want to preserve
responsibility,
to show that man is
responsible
for what he is and what he
does.
In this they failo
Man, according

-----------9 Jean
Existence,"

Wahl,
"Martin Buber a.nd the Philosophers
of
in Th f9 Ph ilo so pn,_y pf Mar t in Buter,
Maurice

Friedman and Paul Schlipp editors,
(LaSalle,
Illinoiss
Open ·ccurt Publis hing Compan y , 196? ) f p . 500 .
10 P

· ·, · -•~ k , ,~X],_S3,et
"' · .....,..,
· · , , ·•.fillH
au 1 .·ROiJ.DJ..CZ
,tl.~J.

(Cambridge:

Cambridge

University

1
F or fill d gains
•

Pres s,

t,

1966}, pp. 88-89~

··

7

to the m, i s res pon sible f or his actions
to himsel f , but a s t he re is n o given
moral i t y, he can con s ta nt l y chan ge the
princip le s on which he bases his actions.
Though mos t existent ialists
deny it, this
leads once more t o.wards a conce pt of the
absolutef
f er, t o make sP.nse, responsibility
demands dependence on a transcendental whic h is absolute.
'l'o make se nse,
responsibili
t y has to be, not only 're·sponsibili t y for · but also 'responsibility
to', and man himself is insufficient
to
give meani ng t o the latter,
unless he
admits t he presence of transcendental
elements i n his own nature.
Morality
cannot be arbitrarily
created;
it must have
authority,11
The upshot

of this

authenticity
Sartre

is clear.

value

obligation,

to be authentic

must be grounded

this

of this
and

study,

concept

a problem:

himself

(honesty)

between authenticity

values

presents

by reintroducing

that

gives

or his authenticity

no reason

tions

theory

and responsibility

has contradicted

objective

The Sartrean

is groundless

and inauthenticity
values

and the relationship

essence

that

This will

of authenticity,

will

be

either

the

his authenticity

and no axiological

in objective

of

•

and there

is

difference
.Authenticity

and it

is the implica-

between authenticity,
examined in the rest

be done by analyzing
specifically

Martin

his concepts

of
Buber's
of

11 Paul Roubiczek, Exis t entialis m: For and Against,
(Cambridge:
Cambridge University
Press, 1966), pp. 88- 89 w

8

~4/irklichkei
fhe plan

1

t - (Actuality)

of the

the following

study

_ an~-- Ver 2.·nt.wortan g (Responsibility).
i~ to ha ve three

questions:

I.

.
b e t ween essence
re 1a t 1.on

wortung;

· Life ··of Dialogue;
and alienation

III.

Wirkli~~keit;

. .... ?
an d au th en t. 1c1..,y.,

What is the relation

authenticity?,

s.actions

What is the
-1
.L.

between objective

' The Overcoming

his

life?

Verantvalues

and

of Nothingness--The

How ca.n modern ·man overcome
facing

examining

the

separation

I.
Unwirklich
Alles

WIRKLICHKEIT

bleibt,

wer nicht

verwirklicht.

wirklicke

Leben ist

Begegung.

.

2

Buber seldom uses the words authenticity
The key terms that
Friedman

have led commentators

to speak about authenticity

one of its

derivatives,

this
reason

is on.e of the reasons
to leave

it

I and Thoq render

lates

Wirklichkeit

as "reality".

I leave

wquld agree

on,

Maurice

Another

the two translators
K2.ufman trans-

reason

is one that

are lost

to leave

the

both translaiors
due to the richby

rendering

1Martin Buber, Daniel in Werke:
~rster
Band
?Chri -ften Zur Philosonhie,
( Munich:
Lambert Schneider,
1962), p. 24.
2Yiartin Buber, Ich und Du, Ibid.,
p. 85
9

of

and Ronald Gregor Smith

Some of the associations

of the German Wirklichkeit

thoughtand

untranslated.

Walter

the best

language

er

Wirklichkeit

in Buber's
it

differently.

But perhaps
original

ness

notions

as uactuality"

term in its

like

are Wirkliqhkei:t.

in German is that
it

or authentic.

for example wirklich.

is one of the most important

1

it

;

.

:

-,.-

10

either

"actuality"

-..Kaufman's

"reality"

or real ity' '.

use of "ac -t-uality

to some extent
"reality"
"act"

can -be carried

us i ng "actuality"

for the rare

instances

for the former

to clarify

Buber's

connection

that

exist

in a certain
The concept

claim

Walter
19?0),

point

. that

implying

that

and

is, - to the to being

to how Wirklichkeit
by

is:

second to .

ways of relating

of Wirklichkeit

f rom that

3walter

·and

have

provides

a

I ought to

way.

in I and Thou that

different

(saving

between person

(gegenseitigkeit),

for authenticity

section

use of Wirklichkeit;

the different

on the I; a nd finally
foundation

of this

to his distinction

ego and to reciprocity
influence

English

when he· uses Realita.t)

What I hope to do in the rest

show its

over into

of ways for the verb. 113

in a variety

first,

·

n;suber's .persistentassociation

with wirken
by

is the

over Smith's

" has its · merits

• . Kaufman says,

of Wi·,-klichkei't,

Per example .,, there

has its

roots

"The I of the basic

in the basic

word I-It.

in Buber's
word I-Thou

is

Basic words •••

Kaufman. Preface in Martin Buber,
I and Thou,
¥..aufma.ntranslator,
(New York: Harper Torchbooks,
pp. 45-46.
Cf. also p. 61, footnote
4.

.....
l 1

establish
the

most important

points

·the most difficult

meets the other

for the

the

asks nothing

of the

other

between

being

"other's
for the

other,

I's

of the above quote:

•

sake".

I and Thou, no greed

for !rut"; "what can I get";

refer

are ~i~kli~

(inactual)

that

of

•••

means have
asks

ttI experience";

the I-Thou and I-It

for the I of the I-Thou and unwirklich

for the I of' the I-It.

Buber- says,

4Buber~ I

I have

in-

of the I, and the modes

to the existence

(actual)

"No purpose

occur. -1115 The I of the I-It

"what's

establish

The I-Thou

Only where all

The modes of existence

one

and no anticipation

encounters

".I have".

three ·

In the I-It

11

disintegrated
in it

The basic

he says Thou.

Every means is an obstacle.

way to ·

In the I-Thou one

sake
0

one of

one of

the best

in one of its

men and God.

other

appropriates

tervenes

Perhaps

modes of existence."

words are how one addresses

nature,

I is

of I and rr·hou, but also

on the last - sentence

words establish

realmsi

r,~in' s twofold

to explain.

do so is to focus
"Basic

nce • .,,4

rnod.es of existe

and Thou, pp. 53-54 -. Throughout
this study
used Y.au fman es trari.slation
·out changed his rendering

Ich-Du

as

5 Ibid.,

I-You

back

pp. 62-63.

to

the

traditional

I-Thou.

·1

.. ,

J. L.

Whoever s t a nds in {the I - Thou) relation,
p~~tic i pates in a c~ua lity; •• • wher e t here
is no pa rti cipation
t h~~e i s n o act uality ~
Where t he r e is sel f-a pp ro p~ iation ~ there i s
. no · act ual ity . Th9 more d ir e ct l y th e Thou.
is - touc hed~ th e ~oie pe r f ect the participation. t
The main point
determine

is t hi s:

the qualit

only wher. it

enters

a man's

y of his

into

(the

other .. Where this relation
,.,
withers
away." r Wirklichkeit
is.

refers

it

It

is

to the qualit
important

his

Man is an entangled

I.

actual

I.

It-world

The I-It

in itself

is necessary

when I-It

is man's

seriousness
not live~

cf truth

dominant
listens

7Martin
Torchbooks,

p.

lives

reveal

"The real

self

I.,.Thou) relation
is rejected,

is a qualitative
y of man's

t he

self

notion,

that

Buber stresses

is not evil,

actual

only with

and of
and in-

in fact,

the

The danger

to being.

without

the

relationships

of the

approach

with

life.

of man's
series

and

appears

the real

for human survival.

B~t whoever

6Ibid.,

life.

to re member that

dual" 8 character

fftorturously

relationships

It
It

comes

"In all

a human being

can-

is not human. 09

11J.

Buber,

The Ecli n 9__g_of God, (New York:

1957), p, JO.

8Buber,

I gnd Th ou , p. 69.

9 Ibid.,

p.

85.

Harper

1. -:,

~ ..)

Buber

to clari

helps

f y Wirkl?~~ hke:i.t and its

to man.' s. -.:wofold I by dis tinguishing

oetween

The person

re presents

an
I of the

:I-'fhou

while

the

e g o represents

the

connection

a person

and

the actual
inactual

I of

the I-Ite
There are not t wo kinds of human beings,
but there are two poles of humanity,
No
human bein g is pure person, a.nd none is
pure ego; none is entirel y actual,
none
entirely
lacking in actuality.
Each lives
in a twofold. I.
But ·some men are so
person-02:·iented
that one may call them
persons,
while others are so ego-oriented
that one may call them egos.
The more a
human being, the more humanity is dominated
by the ego, the pore does the I fall
prey
to inactuali
ty o 1 •
In 1957,

further
with the

1:an.y years

comments

after

en this

p sychologist

the above was written,
distinction

Carl

Rogers.

in a taped

Buber made
conversation

He said,

A person,
I would say, is an individual
living
really
with the world.
With the
world, I don't mean in the world ·--j ust
in real £.onte-,ct, in real reciprocity
with
the world in all the points in which the
world can meet mane12
Characteristic

of the person

is engagement.

Characteristic

10 Kauf :nan translates
Eigenweseu with "ego" while Smith
uses "indi -,riduality".
In a footnote to I an<!_Thou, (p. 111,
footnote
7 ) Kaufman comments on Buber's dislike
of the Smith
version ~
11 Buber, I and Thou, pp. 114-115.
12 Martin Buber, "Dialo gue be-cween Martin Buber and Carl
Rogers" i n The _!\.
now.led ~@ o:( Man, Maurice Friedman Edi tor,
(New York:
Harper Torchbooks,
1963), p. 184.

~

•,••

l.4

of the .ego is detz ichriient ~· · · T.he person ' engages

meet.

The ego detaches

in tJ:rder

to

in order

to , e;t:pe::ience and use.

The ego does not pa rticipate
in actuality,
nor does he g~.in a:1y. He sets hi:ns ·elf apart
from everyt hing else and tries
to possess as
much as pos sibl e by means of experience
and
use.
That is his dynamics:
setting
himself
apart and taking ?uss 7s~i?n--ari.d the ·~b~ect
is always It, tha.1: whicn is no"t actuaJ.. 3
So in Buber's

philosophy

have a precisely

defined

meaning.

the man whose life

is centered

and who is wirklich

(actual).

man whose life
is unwirklich

revolves

person

and ego are terms

The former

around

around the I-It

{unactual)

is given to

the I-Thou

The latter

that

relation

refers

to the

relation

and who

..

How much of a person a man is depends
on how strong the I of . the basic word
of his I.
I-Thou is in the human duality
The way he says I--what he means when he
says I--decides
where a man belongs -and
where he goes.
The word "I" is the true
(That is the
shibboleth
of humanity.
password that distinguishes
one group of
men from another.)
Listen to itl
Uow
dissonant
the I of the ego sou.~dsl 1
Let us now e.xamine Buber• s notion
its

connection
Buber claims

of reciprocity

and

to Wirklichkeit.
that

"Relation

tJBuber,

l and Thou,

14 Ibiq_.,

p.

t5Ibid.,

pp.

Pc 114·.

115.

58 and 67~

is reciprocity".

15 What

.1.5

he means by this
I,

that

is,

wirklich

if

often

I relate

(actual)

unwirklich

how:

ist

while

{ inactual).

rt:'ilate

to another

been misunderstood.

the other
I-Thou

partner

manner.

since

tion

Buber claims

in the I-It

statement

this
that

also

it

it

is possible

respond

in the I-Thou m~nner.

clarify

this

by

has

in the
interpreta-

to have an

with a tree, 16 which obviously

I-Thou relation

I am

1

to mean that

must respond

is an erroneous

my
I am

of Buber's

Some have taken

of relation
However,

in the I-Thou,

if I relate
'rhis

affects

to others

cannot

Malcolm Diamond helps

to

saying:

Since the term I-Thou so strongly
suggests
the personal,
critics
often seem to believe
that Buber imagines tha.t the tree is aware
of him in the same sense that he is aware
of it.
They do so, however,
the face of
his denial of any such notion.
7

iy

But another
that

"Relation

interhuman

problem

is reciprocity"

relationships,

when both partners

16cr. Buber's
ways of relating

arises.

relate

Many take
to mean that,

an I-Thou relation
to each other

Buber's

saying

at least

cccurs

in
only

in the I-Thou.

beautiful
description
of the tree
to it.
Ibid.,
pp. 57-59.

and the

17M.3.lcolm Diamond.
MartJ •..11l3.JJ.ber: .:'ewish ~xistentialist,
(New Yorks Harper Torchbooks,
1968), p. JO.

This toQ is a mistaken
and answer

are not the essential

·re 1·at J••-on··• " 18

. o be
· ·· ·sure,
·
'T

both parties

relate,

·I think ·this
tion

interpretation

of . I and. Thou.

to confusions

because

two different

which Kaufman tra.~slates

refers

above,

of all

I-Thou

mutuality,

refers

a relation

address

ideal
all

to the fact

to the situation

the other

relations.

-transla:..

word

Buber
words -.

as reciprocity,
when I say Thou

can be predicated
which Kaufman renders

Mutualitat,

in human relationships,
I-Thou

that

Geg§.p.seitigke.it

relations.

is not necessary.

by one English

things - by the

my I becomes actual.

I-Thou .

· wnen
'
1.s
·

to Sm1th's

Gegenseitigkeit,
as stated

·

two Gerl!'""tn words

lie translates

means two different

but it

can be tracetl

This leads

, of .the

· · l · s1
· · ··tua ·tion
··
1.a.ea

and ~utuc:lU,ta:t)

19

(mutuality).

"Mutua~speech

. cr ·iteria

in the I-Thou,

error

(Gegenseitigkeit

'
tne

.

where both pa.rtners

as Thou.
but cannot

In the postscript

Mutuality

of

is the

be predicated

of

added to I and

18 Grete Schaeder,
The Hebrew Humanism of Martin Bube~,
Noah J. Jacobs translator,
{Detroit,
Michigan:
Wayne
State University
Press,
1973), p. 41+8.
1 9on pages 82 and 88 of Ich gn~ Qg in Buber's Werke he
wrote
"Beziehung ist Gegenseitigkeit.11
Which Smith translat~s as "Relation
is mutual",
pages B»and 15. On page
166 Buber wrote " ••• die volle l'!lutualitat
nicht dem
"
Mi.teinanderleben
der Menschen inhorict."
which Smith transla ,tes as
full mutuality
is not inherent
in men's life
together."
p. 1J1,
O

•••

, ,..,
J.

{

'rhou in 1957 Buber wrote: ·
Everything
tuality

tells
does

you that
inhere

:10-c

complete
in men's

mulife

with one a no t her.
It is ·~ form of
grace for which one must always be
prepared but on which one can never
count.
Yet there are :also m-:--.nyI-Thou
relationships
that by their very nature
.,.,0
may never unfold into complete mutuality.~
The last
connection

task

of this

between

section

Wirklichkeit

in what way an essence

is to discuss
and essence

can help provide

the !

and to show

a foundation

for

authenticity.
Implicit

in Buber's

essence,

an essence

In order

to avoid

that

the term

as it

that

'essence'

it

how man "ought

the accidental.
thing

deter .mination
For example,

I, as a hu.~an being,

essence

in this

defines

me as being

Buber,

out here

does not have the same connotation

terminology

"essential"

to be."

must be pointed

does in the Aristotelian-Thomistic

to the

is an

of Wirklichkeit

defines

confusions

Aristotelian-Thomistic

20

concept

traditional

cannot
sense

178.

In

the term essence
of a being

be other

than

is precisely
than

refers

as opposed

the human essence

human rather

I and Thou. p.

tradition.

something

to

is someI am.
that
else.

An

which
It

18

is something
. nature

that

trient.

Essence

I am., and no t a 1r..a
t t~r

notion.

we can turn

primary

there . tc illustrate

'essence'.

can also

Analogous

speak

individual's

of the

a person

(or not virtuous)o

to the

of a man's character
to being.

. man's essence,

a man is

or essentially

an ego

of the · essential
essential

is the manner with which
succinctly,

when Buber

a man ought to actualize

a man ought to become virtuous.
or real

self

one

of an

and for Buber this

To put it

like

sphere

determination

Here we are speaking

is a possibility

his essence
For Buber,
that

is

~

actualized

in the I-Thou relation.

person,

in Buber's

simply

a birthright.

i
1

Since

rather

technical

Really

existing

meaning of the word,

Buber sees man's essence

than an ontological

·

use of the ·

ontological

(or virtuous)

determination

he means that

is

is the ethical

Thus Buber can say that

of character

makes a statement

trac.ition

a dif:ferent

determination

he relates

of choj.ce . or achive•w

concerns

"essential''

character.

essentially

.is the factual

-

one of Buber's

Since

· It

in the Ar:i.stolelian-'rhomistic

an ontological

term

alt er or change.

I cannot

prir:ciple.,

as a
is not

as an axiological
it

is an achievement,

19

a possibility

to wh ic h ma n i s ca lled

reconcilable

wit h man~s fr eed om.

axiological

sen s e, ~akes a claim,

onman--"he

ought to exist

his

a 13sence.

absurd

it

is used the
since

Essence,

way",

because

sense

person

claim,

man is free

to answer

is no obligation,

sense

One of the reasons

Sartre

the obligation
denies

is not free.

For Buber,

ought to be",

but there

t o meet

become.

if

man i s

he so

t o be authentic
to be a

of the word, does no·t mean there

then man has a blueprint

whether

but one that

to decide

if God exists

has designed

if the term

or not answer the call

only that

indeed,

or

wi_th freedo m

Man may be inauthentic

But because

in Buber's

is achieve

or Aristotelian-Thomistic

is reconcilable

it makes an inescapable

or inauthentic,

essence"

i on

help being what he is by nature.

not forced .to answer.
chooses.

that

it wou ld be meaningless

ontological

one cannot

in Buber's

in th e

imposes an obligat

to say "one ought to be one's

essence
sense

Ma.n's essence,

.a certain

In contrast,

and therefo r e

God's design
is no necessity

man for a certain

can be shirked.

God is that

he thinks

he must follow

and

of man is "what we
compelling
goal

but ~n

us.

God,

chooses

the demands of becomi ng what he ought to

The existe nce of God provides

Buber with the final

20

source

of w.an' s axiol: ,g:ical ess en ce and his

God is

the

sanctioning
.

•.

striving

for

is accountable
or the kind

authenticity

power behind ine . obligation

·.

of -

. .

the goal

of authenticity.

:to and responsible
of individual

Ultimately

to God for his

he .ought to .be.

man
character,

. I

'

II.

VERANTWORTUNG

In the Introduction
to be meaningful

I intimated

section

discussed

and shown to provide

ticity

implying

section
values

Buber's
will

Buber's

notion

of Wirklichkei~
some foundation

acceptance

in connection

In this
of ethical

with h:is notion

of

(responsibility).

the independence
is reflected

tive

was
for authen-

of the objectivity

There are two main points:

and second,

In the

what man ought to become.

be discussed

Verantwortung

for authenticity

it must be based on obligation.

preceding

by

that

Buber's

values

on

which

of Sartre's

denial

of objec-

values~

Buber has argued

throughout

values

must be independent,

cannot

ultimately

mere usefulness

emphasis

Verantwortung (responsibility),

of

analysis

Buber's

of ethical

and absoluteness

in his notion

ethical

first,

rest

to men.

his writings

that

on the will
He

is,

the value

that

of an act

of men nor on the act's

says,

We mean by the ethical ••• the yes and no
which man gives to the conduct and
actions
possible
to him, the radical
21

ethical

22
<

distinction
bet wee:h ther.:i ·which affirms
or denies t hem z1ot ac::.co rding to the i r
usefulness
or harmfulness fo r ind i v id uals
and .society,
but according to their intrinsic
value . and disvalue .1 .
Buber claims

that

values

are intrinsic

not merely projections

things,

Further,

he holds

necessary
pendent

that

values

properties

of individ -ua·ls

of real

or s0ciet1es.

can have the _ authority

to impose an obligation

only if they are inde-

and absolute.
One can believe _ in and accept a meaning .
it,
or a value ••• if one has discovered
not if one has invented it.
lt can
become for me an illuminating
meeting,
giving value,
orily if it .
a direction
has been revealed to me in my meeting
with being, not if I have freely chosen
it for myself among other existin g possibilities
and perhaps have in addition
decided with a few fellow creatures:
This shall be valid from now on. 2

To say that
implies

values

must be discovered

the independence

something

overagainst

of value.

me that

rather

than invented

Discovery

I find

out.

It

points

to

intimates

a

I

relation
discovery

i

that

I unveil

1 Buber,

12

Ibid.

I enter

into

with the thing

and recognize

The Eclipse

something

of God, p. 92.

I discover.
that

exists

In

23

independently

of me.

c;o1rery and invention

agreements
origin

the

o:f ethical

of the

values

presence

are

of . unive -rsal
-tendency

characterized

of relativism.

major

dis-

Buber holds

that

. of man whi l e Sartre,

creation

of values,

independent

the

with his

ho ld s that

values

man is

of any interest".

much of contemporary
of value

forms and attempts

traditionally

But it

philosophy

Our age denies

4sartre,

Existentialism,

d~fin~s

values

as .

values

as

no wonder that

the independence

God and the absolute
in man's

in God's.

Humanism of Existentialism'#~uotes
3Buber,

of value

to some form

is really

denies

con-

and

man is seen as the originator

to place

been placed

theories

of value

and R. B. Perry

since

is the

A. J. Ayer sees

For example,

"objects

of value.

Recent

by the reduction

character

"To deny the

and norms--that

of our age." 3

expressions"

absoluteness

and non-relative

few in our time.

"imotive

its

one of the

of values.

Defenders

are

is

and Buber.

is outside

o:f the free

origin

spicuous

of value

be tween Sartre

of value

doctrine

This dis-:inc ti on between the dis-

Between Man and Man,

in all

of

hands what has

Sartre,
Dostoye~sky

in hThe
who said,

p. 108.

"The Humanism of Existentialism",
p. 41.

in Essays

in

24

"If -Ood:didn't
death

exist,

ev er yt hing would be possible.

of God is also

which have their

the death

ontological

died so d:ki the ultimate
important
ical

to

note

Buber would agree
grounded
about

foundation

that · Dostoyevsky

that

it

ethics

8

really

to a God that

nice

summary of the

When God

is

-is hypothet-

as a statement

of fact.
must be

of · God is not a statement
about

our relation-

r-liarvin Fox gives

exists.

importance

values

It

s statement

of God but rather

ship

in him.

to be meaningful

in God, but the death

the existence

ethical

of - obligation.

source

seems to take

and Sartre

of objective

The

0

of God in Buber's

a

ethics

when he says,
Buber believes
that moral values must be
absolute
and must be related
to an absolute else they cannot be binding at all.
When man is concerned to know what it is
that he really
ought to do there is no
possible
answer except in terms of an
absolute
demand ••• If a man wants to know
what is right and what is wrong, if he
seeks to discover
the intrinsically
valuable, then, Buber believes
he must appeal .
to the absolute.
In this commitment to
absolute
values we see one side of Buber's
namely the conviction
moral philosophy,
that the absolute
(i.e.
God) exists,
that
he is the source of values and of moral
obligation,
and that all men are accountable to him.)
I have quoted

Fox at length

5Marvin Fox,
in The Philosophy

because

he stresses

an important

"Some Problems in Buber's Moral Philosophy",
9..f Martin
Bub~, p. 153.

-

25

of Buber Is ax i olo gy .

side

they a .re grounded
absolute

in the a bsolute,

can give the quality

gation."6

The obligation

demands on all
and varied

men,

-peoples

a place

firtds

ontological
because

for

he believes

also

the

holds

without

6 Buber,

He can uphold

he knows it

he keaps their

objective

values

responsible,

or not"

dependence

one can recognize

recognizing

Buber tried

because

to a being superior

ontological

that

values

philosophy

to his

whether
own will

of society.

I say •whether
stresses

must inwardly

117 Buber's

man is ultimately

or not,

and the decrees

named or unnamed,

as well as individuals

objective

places

the countless

is an authority,

there

an

"Only

to a.n obli-

of objectiv ~ values

foundation.

he knows it

of absoluteness

of themselves,

an account

Bi1ber says,

"Over and above all

to which communities
render

be ab s olute . unless

Valu e .$ cannot

of values

The Eclipse

this

.Qf

in his

while

Buber

on God he

and acknowledge

and acknowledging

to clarify

because

values

God's existence.

"Replies

to My Critics".

Go~. p, 18.

71.'ft.artin Buber, ~rael
and the World,
.
Schocken Books, 1963), p. 220,

(New York:

26

Fox accuse d Buber of making v a lu es epistemo l ogically
depend en t on God, that
8

know God first.
If I taught
opinion

act morally.
Buber's

I would,

since

they ontologically

of knowing (ordo

of ethical

values.

that

8 Fox,

9 Buber,

to

(responsibility)

Once again

out more clearly

it

in the ethical

in the German than in
an intimate

Antwort

in Buber's

of Martin

is the richness

the term untrans-

as in English,

(to respond),

"Replies

and absolute

of responsibility

"'S ome Problems

in The Philosonhy

to values

gan be known prior

prompts me to leave

There is,

between a.ntworten

values

of

But in the order

on the independent

The significance

the English.

In the order
prior

of Verantwortung

his emphasis

is brought

way:

9

opinion."

in God.

concept

of the Ge~n

sense

cognoscendi)

that?

in God could not

on him.

depend

I must

have to be of the

God is necessarily

or belief

Buber's

lated.

indeed,

could be put this

(ordo essendi)

character

"Where do I teach

But I am by no means of that

being

reflects

to knaw values

a man who does not believe

position

knowledge

in order

B1,.tber responds•

that,

that

is,

Buber,

to My Critics",

connection

(response),

Moral

p. 159.

Ibid.,

Philosophy",
p. 700.

27

verantwortlich
bility)

(r e s ponsib l e) , and Vera nt wortung

• . But t he .Engl i s h does not convey what the root

the German word does.
that

(responsi-

Wort; is the word,

demands a response.

remember that

'responsibility'

sense

of being

'word'

(Wort)

word (Wort)

Smith says,

in actual

or claim

"If

carries

'answerable',
life

call,

· or claim

the reader

in itself

the significance

will

not be lost.
values

will

the root

then

of objective

of

of the

1110

The

demands a response

(Antwort).
For · Buber,

w~n is responsible

he has an obligation
values · make.
the ability
way, that

in the face

Responsibility
and duty

of the claim

to being

takes

Nathan Rotenstreich

the phenomenon of responsibility
sense

is that

of being

of responding

supposed

qua acco~ntability.

because
•

ethical

for Buber means that

to respond

is in a way that

own account.

(verantwortlich)

to respond,

being

to a call
that

in an appropriate

seriously

says that
in its

man has

on its

..Buber stresses

two senses--the
and the other

is to say,

one

is that

responsibility

1111

10 Ronald Gregor Smith, Translator's
Notes, in Between
Man and Man, p. 206, note 2.
11 Rotenstreich,
"The Right and Limitations
of Buber's
Dialogical
Thought r•, in The Ph1losophy of Martin Buber, p. 99.
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Bu1::er says -that

"Genui ne r e s pon r;ibility

· 1.
•
wh E:T
L "t11ere
.1.s
r~a 1 _.re sp ond'.1.n g. ,.12
.

fu -lfills

his

that

responds

is,

responsibility

':rhe connection

against
of being
lies

ethical

out,

appropriately
him.

overagainst

implies

compliance

Buber's

final

pointedly
lence'
hearing
· silence."

ethical

s uggests

has started

himself

severe.

Sar t re's
that

Sartre

12 Buber,

Be t ween Man and Man, p, 16.

13Buber,

The Ec l ipse

of po d, p, 69~

He

from the

what part

heard has played

:furt -her criticizes

values.

And as we would expect

Sartre

asking

existe nce

of any relation

is quite

11

one sphere

en compliance

of Sartre

and our not having
-He

represent

ethical

on the rejection

that

that

of what is over-

of authentic

emphasis

or obedience.

of God without

13

values

t o objective

analysis

claims

when man becomes aware of and

to Buber's

view of man is based

to

and Verantwortung

philosophy

man and part

in the co mpliance
In contrast

and co mplying

to the importance

Objective

responds II'

values.

Buber's

is actualized

one

In the ethical

between Wirklichkeit

can now be brought

responds

he "realiy

means recognizing

of objective

man's essence

This means that

in the I-~hou manner.

realm responsibility
the claim

when

exist s only ·

'si-

our not

in that
by saying~ ·

29

Does exist e nce r aal ly mean, as Sartre
t ·hinks, existi ng " for cn esel f", encapsuOr does
lated in one I s own subjec ·t ivi ty?
it not essential
ly mean sta nd in g overagainst
t he :x.---not an x, but the x itself.
"God," says Sartre,
"is the quintessence
of the Other."
But the Other for Sartre
is he who "loo ks at" me, who ~akes me into
an object,
as I make him ••• But what if God
is not the quintessence
of the Other, but
rather
its absoluteness?
And wh~t if it
is not primari ly the reciprocal
relation
of subject
and ob je ct which exists
between
me and the other,
but rather
the reciprocal relation
of I and Thou?1 4
Sartre,
the

to be sure,

I-Thou

I-Thou
being

has failed

relation.

at all.

In fact,

Sartre,

only in terms

relegated

all

and a threat

of the

relationships
to the

because

to see the

importance

he has failed
he sees

subject-object
to that

individual's

man's

of

to see the
relation

relation

of conflict,

to

has
possession,

freedom.

Sartre
limits
human relationships
a I1.riori
to my knowing the other as subject
only
when he knows me as object,
or, at best,
to my recognizing
his freedom only as a
freedom I wish to posses and dominate by
my own freedom ••• Buber sees the I-Thou
relation
as the existential
and ontological reality
in which the self comes into
being and through which it fulfills
and
authenticates
itself.15
In Good and Evil

14Tb·d
.:!:....1,_.

•

15 ~.aurice
pp. xvi-xvii.

pp •

Buber describes

what he considers

to be

67-68 •

Friedman,
·

Introduction

to Between Man and Man,

30

-the mcst radi.cal

of evil

and it

of, , the . fa ~te that

a cri~ique

.like

stage

man to.

"By glorify

own

creator,

he commits the lie

shall

it,

no longer

. ·
ordains

Sartre's

of fine

that

address

Throughout
to be absolute
section

Sartre's
and claim

responsibility
his philosophy
must ultimately

we noted

what man ought to be.

(New York:

he

for truth

freedom destroys

all

and face

our

based on truth

and

has burned every

but still

· seems · to say "we

existentialism

leads

"where

can touch me, for everything
has become a :phantom. 1118
Buber argues
be rooted

that

obligations

in God.

In the

how God was · seen ·as the source

of .

In this

out

16Buber, Good and ~vil,

Smith,

yea,

as such but what he

17 Sartre

leads . to an .,ought''

is "my property";

. first

radical

thecries."

as his

over •being;

"We want a doctrine

ought to be honest."
no primary

being,

but he wants us to .be honest

He says,

not a lot

h1mself

against

·to Tule

·

dooms his authen-

be what he experiences

of value,

situation.

bridge

the -lie;

·
as such.
."16

notion

Sartre

ing .and blessing

tic

wants to raise

sounds remarkably

Charles

section

Translated
Scribner's

it was pointed

by Ronald Gregor
Sons, 1953), p. 138.

17sartre,

"The Humanism of Existentialism"t
in Existentialism,
p. 50.

18Buber, Between Man anq Man, p. 45.

in Essays

that

Buber sees

ethical

values.

supposes
realm

He addresses

me and that

.

His reason

one who addresses

independent

--·

19 Ibid

God as the ontol og:tca l basis

of myself,

me about

is that

of objective

«Responsibility

me primarily,

that

pre-

is from a

and to whom I . am answerable.

something

I am bound to take

that
care

he has entrusted
of loyally.

1119

to

III~

THE OVERCOMING
OF NOTHINGNESS

We have seen Zarathustra
bone weary
atop his mountain
wondering,
pondering
if he has really overcome
his nihilism-the master's
ressenti ment.
Said

Yes?

-

Remember Orestes,
leaving Argos
self-triumphant
pursued by the Fury-Flies
after reaching his
nothingness?
Wasn't it the Knight of Faith
who leapt past-across the abyss
of his despair
and

found

God?

32
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In keepi11 g wi t h t ~1e exi st entialis
too,

graphically

modern man.

s peaks of nothingness

In this

section

t tradition,

Buber

or t he abyss facing

I hope to show what · the ·

pro 'blem of nothingness

is in Euber• s philosophy

and how

his

attempts

problem.

"life

of dialogueu

To say that
hints

that

nothingness

disagreement

Nothingness

for Buber is not,

ontological

foundation

condition

of modern man.

separation

(Versonderung)
other

of nothingness

and alienation

it

lies.

Sartre's

involves

life's

Nothingness

and man's alienation

absurdity,

Nothingness

of man's
(V~rfremdung)
ontological

is to be sought

man's misery and his greatness.
it

1

It

is his misery

2

use

because

for Sartre

w.an• s complete

from others

the

of the tragic

It is a metaphor

that

resolved

is for Sartre,

description

men and God.

implies

is where authenticity

as it

be .

with Sartre.

of man's existence.

in Buber is a metaphorical

this

is a proble.m to

Buber has another

from nature,

to resolve

it

is
because

loneliness,

and even himself,

and

1cr. Sartre,
Being and Nothingness,
Chapter One and
Ethics , p. 79 "From this nothingBarnes, An Existentialist
ness stems man's freedom.
11

2

,

Buber, I and Thou, p. 107s
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his

greatness

because

by being

noth i ng man is absolutely

.,
Bu-ber, ,..,to .. the _contrary,

free.~

dition

that

in its

various

position

can .and -ought
forms

that

s$es nothingness

to .be overcome.

can and should

Buber,

Nietzsche

_as a con-

That nothingness

be overcome

4 and Kierkegaard

is a
agree

en. -

'\

Nothingness
. Metamorphoses

is found

11
•

5

in Nietzsche's

With stirring

advancement

of nihilism

first

is the camel--the

herci's
stage
dragon

stage
values

that

are

and its

thrust

the camel becomes . a lion
"Thou Shalt''

with

"On the Three

images : he tells
eventual
beast
on its

who revolts

the roarous

overcoming.

of burden
back.

of the

who bears

The
the

In the second
- and fights

NO of nihilism.

the
But

3sartre

uses nothingness
in both -the ontological
and
metaphorical
senses.
Ontological
nothingness
provides
the
basis for man's absolute
freedom.
Metaphorical
nothingness
~efers to man's anxiety about being absolutely
free,
i.e.,
his anxiety
about his total
responsibility
for himself.
4 In saying that Nietzsche
saw nihilism
as something
to be overcome I am taking a stand in something of a controversy.
Arthur Danto in Nietzsche
as Philosopher,
(New York:
is
MacMillan Company, 1970), p. JJ, argues that Nietzsche
a "complete nihilist".
Richard Schacht in "Nietzsche
and
!_ Collection
of Critical
EssaY§.,
Nihilism",
Nietzsche:
Robert Solomon editor,
( Garden City, New York, 197J),
pp. 58-82, sees Nietzsche's
nihilism
as a transitional
stage of his philosophy.

5 Friedrich
Nietzsche,
1hus Spoke Zarathustra
in The
Portable
Nietzsc he, Walter
Kaufman translator
and editor,
{New York:
The Viking Press,
1968), pp. 137-140.

ni hilism

is overc ome when th e lion

•yes-saying"

chil d .

Kierk ega ard,

·Death 6 describe s the abyss

is a significant

difference

their

(nihilism

respective

and despair)

goals

But

between nothingness

in

and Kierkegaard,
respective

emptiness

drives

In light

other

man's separation

entering
spheres.

of dialogue

we can expect

and alienation

of the problem of nothingness

to lie

According

relationships

nor the

existence.

to find

appropriate

in

which

leads

expect

into

We can also

to

(Wirklichkeit).

between modern man and his relations

men, and God.

resolution

living

man to authentic

of his philosophy

Buber to analyze
of the rift

real

as that

in any form is not the path that
that

steps

"
Ubermensch
and the faith

(the

away from and prohibits

Nothingness

for ms of

as necessary

and love of God); Buber sees nothingness
takes

all

God.

and Kierkeg aard see their

nothingness

t hat confronts

in and loving

Buber and nothingne ss in Nietzsche
Nietzsche

the

i n t he §.,ickness Unto

of despair

men and is overcome by believing
there

trans f orms into

in these

in terms
to nature,
Buber's
in man's
three

to Buber it · is in the realm of the

6soren Kierkegaard,
The ;3ick ness Unt o Death, Walter
Lowrie translator,
( Princeton,
New Jerseys
Princeton
University
Press, 1954), pp. 155 and 194.

"Between' ' that

it

is there

the

proi::le m

.it must

of no thi

'oe reme died .

ngness arises
Rotenstreich

and so
says,

He sees the remedy of the human predicament imp l ie d i n the sickne ss of our time
in the fulfillment
of the relationship
between I and Thou .. Because of the
strees
laid on the remedy of the sickness
· of time• he reaches a point where · o·ntolby
ogy is a matter of fact replaced
imperatives.
7 .
·· ·

The Experience
In his
chaos

novel

facing

modern man.

restlessness

these

Buber artistically
Reinhold

of nothingness;

experience
Rather

Daniel

of Nothingness

have become by cornrades."

and out of place
9

"my sister".
, by the

in the world,
Reinhold

ocean's

stillness

arises

the

7Rotenstreich,

Buber's
Buber,

Dialogical
P•

Daniel,

.9Ibid~,

p. 84.

about

Reinhold

boat.

feels

separate

he used to know as
attracted

As quickly

by a new

as a summer

and became a stormy

"The Right and the Limitations
of
of Martin
Thought" in The Philosophy
p.

82 •

his

anxiety--

and beckoned

changed

the ·

know any calm.

how one evening

splendor

1.)2.

8 Buber,

8

and beauty,

sea's

Daniel

and the worst

a world

relates

moon, he went out in a small
storm

tells

"I no longer

and wandering

describes

37

gulf

that

fe nce d Reinho ld ~f r: c:,. 3:·~ore .

This

separation

became an i :.age of the a byss ln Rei nhold• s li fe.
abyss was be t ween piece
thing

and thing,

and me• .,to

After

of separation

an d piece

of t he wor l d, between

between image and being,
finally

rea.ching

and estrangement

"The

between the world

the shore this

feeling

did not leave.

shattered;
broken I
There my las t security
set foot on t he shore, and when I s et foot
on the shor e , · i t was to me a discordant,
l i fe.
Behind me the storm rose
disjointed
over the sea, before me lay the calm land;
but it was to me as though I now left the
last,
fearful
hiding place of calm and
entered into the harsh storm that would

never end.

Since then the abyss
times, 11
Reinhold's
describes
length

experience

as ..homelessness"
throughout

his works.

is before

depicts

me at all

a situation

that

Buber

and which he has analyzed
Buber says,

I
In the history
of the human spirit
distinguish
between epochs of habitation
and epochs of homelessness.
In the former
man lives in the world as in a house, as
in a home. In the latter,
man lives in the
w~rld as in an open field and at times does
not even h e four pegs with which to set
up a tent.

12

84.

tOibid,.,

p.

11 Ibid.,

pp. 86-87,.

12 Buber,

Between Man and Man, p. 126.

at

38

He further

divides

homelessness

social

. .Soci?-1 .l':l.omelessness _refers

.. _.homelessnes.s.
.

and cosmic

and alienation

man's feelings

.

being

. from other

of being

:forgotten

by or completely

Wian's separation
has its

roots

of man's

and alienation

preoccupation

14

we saw that

with

In looking
authenticity

"when man lets
It-world

for

from his

at Buber's
lies
It

Buber,

l.5Ibid.,

fellow

of the I-It

in the

have its

concept
I-Thou

The charof man's

in his

powers

of Wirklichkeit
relationship

way, the relentless
weeds,

his

own I loses

and the I-It

is neces-

but for modern man, the It-world

The Hebrew Humanism of Martih

I and Jhou,
P• 96 •

cf.

men

relation,

increase

and a decrease

grows over him like

survival,

1 3schaeder,
14

from God.

use and experience.

1115 Man indeed · is twofold

actuality.

to

1113 and

universe,

of our age is the progressive

to relate.

growing

cut-of'f

homelessness

Homelessness

to use and experience

and that

in the

in an over-development

acterization
ability

men, cosmic

"marooned

Social

sep<:1.ra-

.to man's

.

tion

sary

into

pp. 87 and 89.

Buber,

ha~

p. 29.
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become canc erou s, infec ti r<~:100.n ;,;i th inauthenticity
silently

gna wing at the actual

message is th.at this
is accompanied

I.

separation

nothingness

man himself.
stands

world of it." 16
himself.

tion

Man, in turning

of time,

melancholic

from the basic

usurped

to produce,
basic

increased

inherent

to possess,

from

is an indication

of a

of our aliena17

to relate

to experience~

to profit,

human situation"

Our "alienation

from the

is an alienation

I of the I-Thou.

his ways and means of "having"

16 Robert Wood, Martin Buber's
Indiana,
Northwestern University

turns

potentiality

to have.

from the actual

in the

human situati.on."

his life-giving

of

of modern man _or the

in the fact

and normative

by his powers to use,

and normative

ourselves,

it,

the

"The threat

from others,

situation

as Buber puts

.development

Modern man has let
be

reflects

over the I who dwells exclusively

"The problematic

sickness

of self.

but also

Robert Wood says,

main

from others

.

and alienation

The abyss between man and man causes,
abyss within

Buber's

and alienation

.

by a separation

Perhaps

and

from

While man has

he has lost

touch

Onto~,
(Evanston,
Press, 1969), p. 71.

17 ~athan Rotenstreich,
"The Right and Limitations
of
Buber's Dialogical
Thought", in The Philosophy of Martj.n
Buber, p. 122 .
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with how to authentical
sick

ages

gated

it

happens

that

severed

Our age is sick

t he . rt-world,

by the

and fertilized

world,

l y i' be".

living

and stagnant,

and nin

no longer

currents

irri-

of the Thou- ·

becomes a gigantic

swamp

man.H 18

phantom and overpowers

In I and Thou and Between Man and Nian Buber has analyzed
at length
collectivism.

In the modern situation

and chaotic

swinging

1119 Buber rejects

because ·they

are views

impossible.

In individualism

collectivism

there

tolerate

individualism
nwe

of inauthentic

individualism

of man that

is no I,

the Thou, the

have the massive

other

there

make the I-Thou
is no Thou,

tolerate

I and. Thou, p. 102.

19wood, Martin
20 Buber,

Buber's

Bet ween Man~

Ontolo~

" p. 77.

Man, p. 200.

to
to

and collectivism

only We or Us.
cannot

hurna.n1ty

relation

only Ie

One cannot
the I.

Individualism
understands
only a part
of man, collectivism
understands
man
only as a part:
neither
advances to
the wholeness of man, to man as a whole.
Individualism
see •s man only in relation
to himself,
but collectivism
does not
it sees only society.
see man at all,
With the former man's face is distorted,
with the latter
it is maslced. 20

18 Buber,

and

of the penduium from individualism

from one extreme

collectivism,

another.

of modern mans

two extremes

In

41

Collect i v·ism has long

·:),0

by existentialists.

n abhor red
'

Seei ng man only as a cog in ~ome machine
existentialism
herd.

is a reaction

Kierkegaard's

prohibits

believing.

inauthentic

to.

Nietzsche

detests

the

a false

security

that

crowd induces
In Sartre's

is what much of

Argos the people

pawns of Zeus and Aegisthus.

are

Buber too rejects

collectivism.
to escape
Here the human being tries
his destin y of solitude
by becoming
completely
embedded in one of the
massive modern group formations.
The
more massive, unbroken and powerful in
i+.s achieve men ts this is, the more the
man is able to feel that he is saved ,
from both forms of hom~Iessness,
the
social and the cosmic.
Collectivism
in reality

promises
it

man the s~curity

only hides

his

loneliness

is not the remedy of homelessness.

which he craves,

but

and separation.

It

Gabriel

Marcel

comments,

It is true that the human personality
first
attempts
to escape its isolation
by adding itself
to the mass.
Yet
therein
lies an illusion
that reflection
to dis pel . In the midst of a
suffices
collectivity,
man is not with man or
alongside
man. The isolation
is not
surmounted,
it is smothered as a sound
·
may be drowned out by noise.22
But while

collectivism

21 Ibid.,

·

22
Gabriel
Martin Buber.

p.

is recognized

by most existentialists

201.

Marcel,
p. 42 .

"I and Thou" in The Philosophy

of

42

as inauthen t ic,
egoi~ti~

many over - re a ct -by doomi ng man to -an

. individt!alism.

Authenticity

Th is

for Buber, as it

in relating

to the other.

the p~th of' Sartre.

is

should

In Sartre

be clear
it

by

consists

opposing · the · other. 2..3.·-·Buber makes some pointed
of Sartre's

now, lies
of
·criticisms

·.

individualism.
It 1s Sartre who has raised - to a principle
the deficiency
of a person
of existence
who is shut up in himself.
Sartre regards
the walls between the partners
in a conversation
as simply impassable.
For him
it is inevitable
human destiny that a man
has directly
to do only with himself and
his own affairs • . The inner existence
of
the other is his own concern, not mine;
there is no direct relation
with the
other, nor can there be.24

It

is

ironic

that

Buber criticizes

Sartre,

freedom,

for dooming man to fatalism.

clearest

expression

which regards

Homo Saniens
alley

degeneration

fate,

is not where authenticity
2 3cf. Sartre's
fiothingnesg.

No Exit

fatalism

romanticism.

lies--"to

25Ibid.

nature

of

a blind

every thought

of

1125 Individualism

·save himself

from the

and "The Look" in Being and

24 Buber, The Knowledge .Q.f Man. p. 79.

the

of modern man,

of having run into

and which brands

as reactionary

of

nThis is perhaps

as the unch~ngeable

and the misfortune

as his primal

a breakthrough

of the wretched

the upholder

43

despair

,,-:ith which his scli-tary

resorts

•
to the expe d ient

Authenticity
in the

.,Between

collectivism.
that

of mutually

alienation

is the third

(the

alienation

and

possibility
and

only in the It-world

alienated
alienated

and needs.

man.

from others
individuals

Only if man returns

He may dwell
er in a collec-

bound only by their
to meeting will

he overcome the abyss and come to authenticity.
of it

rest

of individualism

away from being truly

in an individualism
tivism

of nothingness

alternatives

The man who lives

falls

.,26

face modern man, and overcomes - social

that

homelessness.

•t
i.

him, man

not in the e:J.Ctremes of individualism

11

The I-Thou relation

collectivism

threatens

1
. "" •
o f g_oriry1ng

and the overcoming

smashes the false

gradually

state

I-Thou relation)

we are not abandoned

of the world and the deactualization

11

By virtue
to the
of the I. 1127

Cosmic Homelessness
Social

homelessness

is the covering

26 Buber,

Between Man and M~,n, p. 200.

??Buber,

I and Tho~, p. 149.

over of the actual

4.4

"I"

caused

the _spher~
roots

by the

ove r d~v!'.•d opment; o'.t t he I-It

of t he i nt er human.

in man's mis-relation

Absolute.
first
second

in his recognition

claim that
section

objective

I want to discuss

of nothingness

tothe

Absolute

of and compliance
make.

from .the

is twofold:

to God, the Eternal

values

in

Cosmic homelessne ss has its

to and di sconnection

Man's connection

in .his relationship

relation

Thou, and
to the absolute

In the rest

how Buber links

to the disintegration

of this

man's feelings

of hisrelations

to

both God and objecti ve values.
In I and Thou Buber claims
I-Thou relation)
I-It

a path leads

relation)

to God, fromine
1128

only to nothingness.

the I-Thou relation
Buber defines
who never

that ."from the former

relates

The main point

latter

In Buber's

is bound to God in several

God as the Eternal
to being

Thou.

(the
(the

thought,
First,

ways.

That is,

as the one

in any way but the I-Thou manner.

way:

can be put this

God is characterized

\.

as being essentially
in contrast
an actual

28

Ibid.,

onefold

to man's twofold
,.,I" and addresses

P•

75.

in his relations
ways of relating.
being solely

v~f • a 1 sop.

150 •

and this

is

God is only

as "Thou".

· Man

45

fluctuatas between actual:. '..Y and inactualit�r, and addresses
being as "Thou" and

0

It".

Perhaps the greatest demonstra

tion of mar1's twofoldness is his relation to God.

Man

ta.kes the Eternal Thou anci relates to him as an It.

"The

Eternal Thou is Thou by its very nature; only our nature
forces us to draw him into the It-world and It-speech.029
Man has many ways of reducing God to an It.

We can see

God as only something we are to profit by,

For example,

gaining eternal happiness or forgiveness.

We can "study"

God and speak about him rather than speak to him.

In his

"Autobiographical Fragments" Buber tells of an incident
with a friend that occurred in 1914.

His friend asked,

"Do you believe in God?•• and Buber answered a quick "Yes."
But the quastion stayed with him long after his friend had
left him.

Later that same day Buber thought, "If to believe

in God means to

be

able to talk about him in the third

person, then I do not believe in God,

If to believe in him

means to be able to talk to him, then I believe in God."JO
Buber made a similar point when he said, "It is not
29

Ibid., p. 148.

30Martin Buber, "Autobiographical Fragments", in The
Philosophy of Martin Buber, p. 24.
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necessary
belleve

to know s omet hi ng cl.bout God in order ·to really
in_ him 1 _ _ many true , believers

God but not about
The second

way I-Thou

r _elations

claim

relation

in the Eternal

•intersect

of that.

word addresses

that

troubled

Buber's

Smith.

that,

are bound to God can

"Extended;
Thou.

Through every

the Eternal

doctrine

to

hi~."3 1

be seen in Buber's

is a glimpse

kn.ow how _to talk

is difficult
translator

the lines

of

Every single

single

Thou the basic

Thou. 1132 This is at best
to prove and one that
and commentator

Thou

a

had

Ronald Gregor

Smith wrote,
This point (that every Thou is connected to
the Eternal
Thou) is undoubtedly
the crux of
Buber's view.
It is in the last analysis
a
matter of faith.
I recall
that I once asked
him a question
about this.
I said something
to the effect
that it was not clear to me
how the Eternal
Thou was to be understood
as
implicated
in each relational
event.
How
could this be proved?
'Proved?'
he replied.
'You know that it is sol'
Now, long afterward, I understand
that this knowing of
which he spoke was a trustful,
believing
knowing.
And trust
of this kind must be
affirmed,
it may even be confirmed as bearing ultimate
meanine:; but it cannot be
demonstratect.33
- ·

31 Buber, The Eclipse
32 Buber,

of God, p. 28.

1 and Thou, p. 123.

-33Ronald _Gregor Smith, Martin Buber, (Richmond,
Virginia•
John Knox Press,
1967;, pp • . 21-22e
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I have neit her t he ti me n o} desire

in this

invobred

of Buber's.

in t his problematic

important
this

and relevant

claim

since

it

claim

to this
points

study

Buber's

an attempt

to make the spiritual

Eventually

that

of the Eternal

Thou is that

are

related.

linked

livable.

between the everyday

in saying

intimately
to his

thread

Much of Buber's

God is found in the everyday
point

What is

world,

to God is

men and to the world.

bound to one another.

The word of

but the word of him who wishes
with men goes astray."
a similar

knows the world as something

a glimpse

and the secular

not fulfilled;

Thou Buber expresses

Kaufman

'l4
in the !2,y."..,

I-Thou gives

to speak with men without

speaking

speaking

35

to God is

to speak with
In I and

view when he says,
by

is

to break

him who wishes

God without

runs

world and religiono

the religious

to other

that

Walter

A man's relationship

relationship

"Above and below are

every

of

philosophy

of 1. ar1d Thou "was partly

the point

down the division

Buber's

thought.

to get

is the significance

to an important

throughout

says that

study

"He who

which he can profit,

34
.
Walter Kaufman, "Buber's Religious
Significance",
~pilosophy
of Martin Buber, p. 682.
35Buber, Between Man m1S!Man, p, 15.

knows

The

same way.n3 6

God in the

For Buber the way to God i s to be found in the Hasidic
notion

of the

"hallowing

the nineteenth

century

Buber studied
Friedman

of the everyday " .
east

European

and was greatly

traces

"The Hebre ,¥ word hasjq

says,

roots

to synthesize

making man's
· message,

everyday

according

to concrete

tion

his

to Buber,
reality

and reached

God by approaching
kindness

his

.

by

"Hasidism's

above all

in its · rela-

message

of Hasidism

God can be seen in

pure deed."

38

Man meets

men and the world with

"loving

11
•

Cosmic homelessness
either

is derived

037 Hasidism

synagogue.

sentence,

by every

He

and the secular

••• The essential

fellow

Maurice

It

kindness.

resides

can be summed up in a sir..gle
everything

by.

that

of "Hasidism".

the spiritual
living

was

mysticism

means 'pious•.

from the noun hesed meaning loving

attempted

Jewish

influenced

the etymological

Hasidism

directly

3 6Buber,

by relating

is man turning

his

to God as an It

back on God,
or not relating

I and Thou, p, 107.

37.Maurice Friedman,
Martin Bgb)rs The Life
(New York:
Harper Torchbooks,
1960,
p.lb.--

38schaeder,

The Hebrew Humanism QI.. Martin

of Dialogue,

Buber,

p.

292.
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or indirect

to him at all,
dominate
acterizes

his

life

:r t y : ~ tti ng the I-It

Buber char-

with othe rs and the worlde

man•s turning

relation

away from God as the

Eclipse

11

of

God".
In our age the I-It relation,
gigantically
swollen, has usurped, practically
uncontested,
the mastery and the rule.
The I of this
relation,
an I that possesses
all, makes all,
succeeds with all, this I that is unable to
say Thou, unable to meet being essentially,
is the lord of the hour.
This selfhood that
with all the It around
has become o:nnipotent,
it, can naturally
acknowledge neither
God nor
any genuine absolute
(such as objective
values) which manifests
itself
to man as of
It steps in between and
non-human origin.
shuts off from us the light of heaven.39
Just

of the sun is ' something

as an eclipse

between

changes

and hides

himself

to God it

but something

between God and us.

The overwhelming

I-It

that

is the obstacle

man's possessive
blind

hides

and solipsistic

to the absolute.

because

occurs

our eyes and the sun and not a change in the sun
4 o so in our relationship

itself"

that

1

the eye suffers

But "its

is not God who

that

has stepped

development

of the

God fro:n our eyes.
attitudes
ligtt

have made him

seems darkened

from a cataract""

39 Buber,

The Ecliu~e

4oibid.,

P• 23.

41 Buber,

Betwean Man and Man, p. 117.

of Go~, p. 129.

Modern

41

only
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Anothe r- source
deafness

of n:an ; s GOSrni c homelessness
n gi-vin g c laims

t -o t he _directio

"°iften

enough ·we think

before

we have ourselves

is exhibited

He seemingly

That man has no basis
the view of Sartre.
nothingness

values.

but long

to hear,

Modern

in his feelings

has no foundation

43

for action

Sartre's

of

whatso-

as the ontological

basis

at ' man's nothingness

But while

for Sartre

homelessness.

of objective

basis

values

of his being.

is
man's

Sartre

of possibility,

of man's radical

is the source

is one of the sources

Because man is free

with possibilities

emphasizes

via the category

possioility

for Buber it

but his own will

philosophy

which he sees as an important

freedom,

of objective

his actions.

ever for

arrives

man's ·

put wax in our ears." 42

man's cosmic homelessness
directionlessness.

is nothing

the.re

is

freedom.

of man's

of man's cosmic

he is always confronted

he can choose between.

Even in the face

man, because

he is free,

has the possi-

or rejecting

what he "ought to do".

·"

bility

of accepting

42 Buber,

I and Thou, p. 137.

43 cr. Jean-Paul Sartre,
is Essays in Existentialism,
the forlornness
and anguish

"The Humanism of Existentialism"
pp. 41-48 where he discusses
that accompany man's freedom.

51

For :Buber possi.bili
ness when man faces
-eclipse

ty

oec;o mes

ethical

choices

of objective

direction

values.

of objective

th e gateway

to nothing-

in the darkness

Possibility,

without

swallows

man in its

values,

of the
the
nothing-

ness.
The human person inevitably
becomes aware
of the category
of possibility
which of
all living
creatures
is represented
just
in man ••• The evolving human person I am
speaking of is bowled over by possibility
as an infinitude.
The plentitude
of possibility
floods over his small reality
and
overwhelms it.44
The category
values,

of possibility~

separated

dooms man to nothingness

of freedom,

longer

concerned

approaching

with

being

was for

of eye,

It

is the

truth,

45 Ibid..,

p•

filJ,g_ Evil,

.5,

is no

I.

By

man meets and discovers
of heart

there

is a

is meaning in what

045

Cosmic homelessness,

Good

that

with the

and to his new view there

44Buber,

to what is over

freedom

but soiely

"With the change

long meaningless.

1
I

to submit

in the I-Thou

meaning and values.
change

and an overglorification

which is a failure

and above the individual.

from objective

like

social

p. 125.

homelessness

is
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cyercome by a ,,.eturn t o t he l ife
addresses

being

as Thou he recognizes

forms of God and objective
God nor moral values
themselves
.
d 1.scover

apart

the

reflects

t he absolute

in its ·

"I can know neither

as transcendent

rr.•ali ties

knowable

in

in which I meet God and

attempt

When social

and conflict

that

homelessness

is

by the

cf nothingness

Buber's

of dialogue

longer

When man

va.1 ues. .. 46

secular.

life

values.

from the dialogue

The overcoming
further

of dialogue.

to join

hom~l~ssn~ss

man is no longer
Sartre

depicts

of dialogue

the religious

and

is overcome by the

doomed to the alienation
in No Exit.

overcome by the life

a directionless

life

and unfounded

When cosmic

of dialogue
being

man is no

in a world

that

is de trop.
Buber sees the inner connection
between
what he calls
cosmic and social
homelessness.
He seems to think that the overcoming through dialogue
of the social
homelessness,
that is to say, of what is
the nearest
homelessness
to the concrete
to the
human being, leads, ll.§.Q facto,
overcoming of the cosmic homelessness
or
vice versa,
the overcoming of the cosmic
homelessness
in the dialogical
situation
between man and God leads to the overcoming

46

p.

Maurice
xviii.

Friedman,

Introduction

to Between Man and Man,

...,..,
1- ,

"'""'c, .!.""·~~ -,Cf -'-he, ov

ical

·Perhap's

1,

-

point

.J.

eould be put this

more.

Seeing

only what "I can get" makes one blind
the other.

Homelessness

preoccupation

spheres

things

he

in light

of ·

to the importance

of

two forms is due to man•s

with only himself,

preoccupation

of dialogue

in its

When :man

wayi

the val ue of being in any of its

opens the door to seeing

this

.:n t·n~
a~alog• ,.,.
'ti. - -

"'.n., r- ;-:Y"!
.,,.1~J_
s- . ....
1~'./'--1°
.. ~~
-·- - ·-- -

si tuatir m betw een man and man. !?

Buber's

recognizes

.;i

and the danger

can become so addictive

that

is that
the life

disappears.

Buber's
solipsistic,

main message is for man to step out of the
all

pervasive

gg,Q

meets being and thus discovers

and become a person who
the meaning that

has been

eclipsed.
YOU YOURSELF MUS'f BEGIN.

EXISTENCE WILL

REMAINMEANINGLESS
FOR YOUIF YOUYOURSELF
DO NOT PENETRATE INTO IT WITH ACTIVE LOVE
AND IF YOUDO NOT IN THIS WA
Y DISCOVERITS
MEANING
FOR YOURSELF. EVERYTHING
IS WAITING TO BE HALLO
WEDBY YOU, IT IS WAITINGTO
BE DISCLOSEDIN ITS MEANING
ANDTO BE
REALIZEDIN IT BY YOU. FOR THE SAKE OF THIS
YOUR BEGINNING,GODCREATED THE WORLD
. HE
HAS DRAWN
IT OUT OF HIIVJ.S
ELF SO THATYOUMAY
BRING IT CLOSERTO HIM. MEETTHE WORLDWITH
THE FULNESSOF YOURBEINGAND YOUSHALLMEET
HIM••• IF YOUWISH TO BELIEVE, LOVEt48
47 Rotenstreich,
"The Right and Limitations
of Buber's
Dialogical
Thought", in The Philosophy of Maill.n Buber,
p.

121.

48 Buber,

On Judaism,

p. 202.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Some Problems
A pri mary

philosophical

problem in Buber's

his unfounded

metaphysical

and objective

ethical

ontologically

depend on God without

justifications

values

for these

than giving

tifications

exist

are at best

between talking

like

man's direct

-relationship

Pascal

for his existence.

Abraham, Isaac

and Jaeob

by

They believe

personally

philosophical

rather

philosophical

these

that

Buber's

arguments.

matters

distinction

and Kierkegaard,

in this

stresses

than rational

All three

want the God of

than the God of the philoso-

and communicating

with

that

God exists

him, not

Even if one is rationally
54

jus-

such justi-

to God points

a man becomes convinced

meeting

Buber i.s

philosophical

He holds

to God rather

justifications

God

proofs.

about God and talking

Buber,

phers.

about

is

values

principles.

ineffective.

direction.

that

these

giving

his not offering

for God's existence.

fications

and that

statements

philosophical

Buber does defend

Buber holds

metaphysical

prone to making oracular
rather

claims.

thought

by

convinced
Talking
done,

G_od ex i st ed ~:.'=' h:.ts ye-c t o be c ome rel i gious.
about God, as r a tion al theology

does not chang e one's

direct

relation

life.

But talking

values

exist.

seen as a polemic
ethical

values

in his

of God and objective

Man's inability

the claim of objective
either's

ethical

non-existence,

deafening

but a result

growth of the I-It

the existence
he attempt

own life.
ethical

to.

They are,

view of the subjective

encountered

values

of

of the blinding

and

Buber does not prove

ethical

values.

Nor does

from the view of the objective
But from the

method they are entities

in his life.

Buber has

What Buber does is offer

abo ut why God and objective
1

•

is

Demonstra-

is not a result

presuppositions.

explanation

For

to see God and hear

attitude~

of God and objective

his philosophical

an alternative

values

men

ethical

they must be met and known personally.

is insufficient,

can be

wby other

and deaf to the God and the objective

such that

really

to explain

he so clear l y sees and hears

method,

God and objective

who deny God and objective

Buber attempts

Buber the very nature

tion

that

Indeed much of his philosophy

a ga in st those

values.

are blind

to God in

does.

Buber is persona l ly convinced
ethical

has traditionally

56

e th ica l values

ha ve be·-~:01:is e cli p-E<~ii to the vision

Buber describ

men ,

e s the purpose

of his

of some

ph i losophy

when

he saysz
I only point to something.
I point to
reality,
I only point t o so ~~thin g in
reality
that had not or had t oo little
been seen,
I take him who listens
to me
by the hand and lead him to the window .
I op:n t~e window and .point to what is
outside,
.
.

The view that
cal values

is not subject

that
for

and one that

ethical

values

justification.

Buber tries
ontologically

The closest

justification
that

to demonstration,

lies

depend

only exists

1Buber,

Martin

Buber,

2Buber,

values

out

why and wants

when the court

for a response,

he grounds

claim

such

of Verantwortung.

bility

to,

But his

Buber comes to giving

112 Since

responsible

knovm

on God cries

wonders

to which I am responsible.
to someone calling

but rather

to defend.

in his analysis

"responsibility

ethi-

is a reasonable

One immediately

an explanation.

says

of God. and objective

seein g or encountering,

by a personal

position

the existence

Buber connects

He
is there
responsi-

or someone I ~m.

in God who is the court

.,Replies to My Critics,"
p. 693.

in The Philosophy

Between Man and Man, Po 17.

to

of

which one is res ponsib le.
to be -this,

If there

then there

must be first,

imperatives

and second,

individual

The l og i c of the argument

are ab solute

imperatives

the demander himself
in order

there

are absolute

they are founded in a demander who is absolute.

true

this

cry from a philosophical

is a far

shows absolute

that

here.

grammatically

values

imperatives

rest

First,

it may be

imply a demander,

in God.

justification

Second,

the connection
of ethical

grammatical

values

fact

but this

for the ontological

that

that

is,

God is the ontological

All I am saying
the case.

Once again

it

here is that

is derived

It may indeed

foundation

of ethical

of values
be the ·case
values.

Buber does not show this

He only says it and thus

from

justification

of the absoluteness
God.

what

is an obvious

is no metaphysical

derivation

clear

being and the absolute-

tha~ the term absoluteness

the term absolute

from the absolute,

is.

imply

than about meta-

Buber does not make it at all

between the absolute

but
that

That imperatives

a demander could say more about our language

ness

must be above

to bestow the quality

on the demands; since

There are a number of problems

physics.

(values)

someone making the demands of the

men and societies

of absoluteness

imperatives

seems

to be

is open to criticism.
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acceptar!c e of God a-::, t he ontolo g ical

Bu.ber•s
tion

of ·value . rn~y have: b~en prompted

influence
attack

that
on the

stressed
basis

that
for

.Nietzsche

Nietzsche

since

objective

tq some degree_ by the

had on him in his

traditional

found.a-

youth. 3

In his

v~ew of good and evil - Nietzsche

God had died
ethical

there

values.

was no longer

any

In The Q§Y Science

says:
"God is .
The greatest
recent event--that
in the Christian
dead, t, that the belief
God has ceased to be believable--is
even
now beginning
to cast its first
shadows
over Europe ••• In the main, however, this
may be said:
the event itself
is much
too great,
too distant,
too far from the
comprehension
of the many even for the
tidings
of it to be thought of as having
arrived
yet, not to speak of the notion
that many people might know what has
really
happened here, and what must collapse now that this belief
has been undermined--all
that was built upon it, leaned
on it, grew into i.t; for example, our whole European morality. 4

In his

philosophy

foundation
Sartre's
tive

of value
position

Buber naively
and argues
that

there

accepts
against

that

God is the

Nietzsche's

and

is no God and hence no objec-

values.

3cr.

Schaeder,
The Hebrew Humanism of Martin
PP• 13, 31 and 385.
4Friedrich
Nietzsche, . The Gay Science,
Nietzsche,
·rranslated
and Edi t .ed by Walter
York: Viking Press,
1968), p. 447.

Buber,

in The Portable
Kaufman, ( New

:39

Another
his

importan t weak:-~ess in Buber's

unclearness

t he self.

about

Wirklichkeit

I tried

term essence

by distinguishing

axiological

In the firs~

t o clarify

Buber's

his essence

for his ethical

character

essence.

Buber's

with the ethical

relation

of man actualizing

and his emphasis

concern

overshadows

ontological
ical

self

statements
the basic

unclear

culties,

there

insurmountable

of relation

5Buber,

him to

of the
The ontolog-

when one finds

"There is no I as such but only the I of

that

there

is no such entity

If Buber does mean this

self.

or

But this

the status

word I-Thou and the I of the basic

self--that

self,

in his philosophy.

Buber seems here to be saying
ical

self

in the I-Thou

becomes even more problematic
likes

man is re-

has lead

on the axiological

or self

and
man

or axiological

himself

and leaves

essence

on

use cf the

When Buber says that

sponsible

his doctrine

section

implied

what he means is that

concern

is

between the ontological

uses of the term.

must achieve

thought

because

is the ontological

I ~nd Thou, p. 54,

word I-It."5

is only the axiologas the ontological

he has insurmountable
implied
self.

diffi-

in his philosophy
The I-Thou

is a

:.::
o
relation

and for there

entit : es _that

are ~related.

is not a result
sense,

t o be a rela ti on there
The I,

of relatio

The ontological

~ust

be

in the ontolog~~~l

sense,

n as is the I in the axiological
I is the necessary

presupposition
..

of relation~

· The axiolo g~cal self

is a qaalitative

and as such requires

the ontological

require

Ithihk

substances,

quote,
says,

realizes

logical

the necessity

is that

is often

contradictory

from relation

the self

the former
apart

self,

distinguish

s~ems confus~d

like:

The distinction
remedies
there

and the latter

the ontological

sel~.

6

His

the onto-

about how he

of this

this

confusion

There is no self

on the one hand and relation

self

He

even though he intimates

and the result

can be rendered

from relation

presupposes

self

statements

on the other.

cal and axiological

the above

for any relationship~"

Buber himself
I and self

as qualities

of the ontological

from the axiological

uses the terms

just

despite

he does not properly

.the difference,

apart

Buber,

"The I is indispensable

weakness

self

notion

presupposes

between the ontologicontradiction

is no axiological
can be rendered
Clarifying

since
self
relation

the distinction

61

between the onto.logical

a nd axiological

ke~.. to unl ocki ng th e mystery

of Buber's.

For example,

is actualized

when Buber says

in the I -Thou.

only with that

(the

I-It

achieved,

not the ontological

being cannot

lose

accentuation

of the category

the role

and importance

The significance
rehabilitative

that

made man "the measure
to correct

only himself

of relation

of Buber's

p.

80.

8Ibid.,

p.

85,

has left

Buber's
unclear

of substance.

philosophy

lies

in its

Not only has Buber not succumbed

has relativized

ethical

of all

but he has actively

things",

values

preoccupation

and

with

ovm purposes,

The key to understanding
?Ibid,,

which a human

is what he is.

it

modern man's crippling

and his

which is

Significance

character,

to the Zeitgeist

I that

"whoever lives

human essence

of the category

Buber's

statements

is not human, 118 he is

human essence

or gain since

s.

"man becomes I

When he says,

to the axiological

again

pr ovides

to the axiological

relation)

referring

tried

to rnany puzzling

a 'l'hou, 117 he is referring

through

self

Buber,

and in fact

his main

62

contribution

to philos ophy l ies in his distinction

I-Thou and I-It

relati

ins.

in the I-Thou relation
against

him should

I ·t s h0u ld _be _cl~a~ _by _now that

the I realizes

be taken

attitude

takes

Thou Buber leads

us to believe

sion

God~-

of the I-Thou relation,

is not restricted
the highest

to personal

dimension

on its

to persons,

but Thou in Buber's
beings,

it

philosophy

The interpersonal

men and God Thou can be addressed

it

can take place.
by

nonpersonal

beings

or relate

being as Thou which is a term usually

With

as well as to the

the problem with Buber's

seems odd to say we can address

is

is where the

as Thou as

with his example of an I-Thou relation

This is exactly

To

dimen-

other

tree.

nature,

and even the highest

I-Thou relating

address

us

men and

of the I-Thou because

But one can also

I-

both other

of reciprocal

Buber explains

own account

what is overagainst

ideal

I.

the basic

is of a personal

i.s an important

dominating

But Buber~s

In calling

that

seriously

man's relationships

a personal

relation.

being seriously

which is to be taken
be sure,

on its· own account

is somewhat misleading.

that

what is over-

with using and/or

as is the I of the I-It

terminol6gy

that

seriously

and he is not merely concerned
the other

between

reserved

to a

terminology ': .

to a nonpersonal
for personal

t:\ .."""
..)

beings~
Perhaps
Buber's

I can halp

terminology

straighten

-by stressing

out this
that

or relate1

how I address

is clear

is addressed
personal

or related

a man's

basic

Buber's

technical

intrinsic

and the value

technical

attitude

of pride

itself.

It

that

"Note well,

9cf. Buber,

that

of the world,

sees

the value

of

of being.

relation,

In

or the
by an

only in light
Buber sees

of

the

becomes the dominant

on inauthenticity.
relationship

and

other

can be characterized

to remem·ber that

Tf.lit Eclipse

in
9 and can

essentially,

recognizes

but when the I-It

not the I-It

and I-It

in one of its

or the ·person

can see everything

man is bordering

Buber what

I-Thou

being

I-It

to

manner can be a

of each sphere

sense,

is important

as necessary

relation

a person

the I of the overdeveloped

ego in Buber's

for

of reverence

importance

In short,

in general

contrast,

I-It

meets being

by an attitude

the

men and God.
being

toward

not

but rather

that

The terms

attitude

sense,

be characterized

appreciates

being.

The I of the I-Thou,

spheres,

to,

to in the I-Thou

or nonpersonal

reflect
three

It

in

the Thou refers

so much to what is addressed
or relate.

problem

itself,

of God, p. 129.

Buber says,
without

which

r

no earth ~y per ·sist ence of hunian existen ce is conceiv;:1.ble
hybr is O\"'ers .rlding

but its

A person
that

recognizes

objective

concerned

values

sees

two stages

due to his
itself".

self

An e go, because

is either · blind

of evil.

In the first

preoccupation

itself

11
•

11

the claim

claim
against

or
it.

between what he
stage

and cannot

In the second stage

"what offers

to this

Buber distin gu ishes

10

•=

he is solely

th e claim but openly rebels

In his Good an d Evil
calls

and willin gl y ac~epts

make.

with himself

even worse,

all. measu .r-e is meant.

one is blinded

see "what offers

one is bent on destroying

Malcolm Diamond says:

(Buber) has called the first
sta ge
of evil the way of the sinners who a ga in .
and again mis s God ' s way throu gh their
failure
to direct
themselves
toward the
good, The stage of radical
ev il is that
of the wicked who oppose God's way w.ith
the basic attitude
of their being. 1~

He

Paul Pfuetze

stages

comments that

of eYil

(as)

resulting

and man's presumptuous
I.

Buber "considers
from absolute

usurpation

self

affirmation

of the moral and creative

iOBuber, "Replies . to My Critics,"
~.artin Buber, p. 716.
11 Buber, Good. and Evi_l, p. JO.
2Diamond, Martin Buber:
Jewish

7

the radical

in The Philosophy

Existentialist,

of

p. 144.

-

._,
~

<
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of God ..13

role

'rhe two st -.',;_
0 i ;;:; 6.f f~•.til represent

of i na uthentic

existence

the axiological

essence

thought.

Buber undersoores

In both stages

to achieve

I :n both man fai.ls

a

two forms

throughou:t

his

the I is the I of the ego.

And

as Buber says:
How disGonant t he I of the ego soundst
When it issues from tragic
lips,
tense
with some self contradiction
that they
try to hold ba ck, it can move us to
great pity.
When it issues from chaotic
lips tha t sava gely, heedlessly,
unconciously represent
contradiction
it can
When the lips are va in
make us shudder.
and smooth
sounds embarrassing
or
disgusting.

i!

The heart

of Buber's

man's capacity

to transcend

to be concerned
appropriate
covering

encompassing
cancer

ego that

other

with that

transcendence

dominates

himself,

with beings

relations
his

philosophy

tion

the basic

principle

authenticity
thought

to transcend
living.

of

man's ability
and enter

which he encounters.

of virtuous

of man's transcendence

is,

than himself

Buber's

the prima .cy of man's capacity
it

that

is what rescues

threatens

our age.

is his recognition

into

Re-

man from the all
and like
tries

a

to restore

himself
Buber's

by making
recogni-

is what makes his and Sartre's

13 Paul Pfuetze,
"Martin Buber and American Pragma.tism,"
in The Philosophy of Martin Buber. p. 537.
14
. Buber, I and ±Pou, p. 115.

existentia
the

l is m re mote.

I-Thou re laticn

the other
Sartre's

except

a nd t Len wonder s v,hy ha cannot

question

and the r e st of being.
of usi ng this
of the

manner worthy

and freely

The reverence

that

I-Thou relation

fact

1 5Buber,

accept

1

that

"It

is a

is,

in a

is a freedom which is

the

that

fact

the values

characterizes

life

I<
'or Buber

t hat it

is the basic

cal and virtuous

of war between an

freedom properly,

to us. 1115 Buber stresses

recognize

see

in · terms -of domin at ion and ·c-onflic ·tG

freedom become s a declaration

indhridual

given

Sh r -tr e :la s cl ose d his eyes · to

intrinsic

the person
attitude

:man must

that

possible,

The Eclip s e of _9-od, p. 69.

to being.

who lives

the

makes the ethi-
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